PROBLEMS OF EN 50 128:2011 RAILWAY STANDARD by Brandejský, Tomáš
doi:10.14311/APP.2016.5.0001
Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings 5:1–3, 2016 © Czech Technical University in Prague, 2016
available online at http://ojs.cvut.cz/ojs/index.php/app
PROBLEMS OF EN 50 128:2011 RAILWAY STANDARD
Tomáš Brandejský
Czech Technical University in Prague, Department of Applied Informatics in Transportation, Faculty of
Transportation, Praha, Czech Republic
correspondence: brandejsky@fd.cvut.cz
Abstract. The second version of railway standard EN50128:2011 published by CENELEC is used
for five years and thus the CENELEC reasons about preparation of new version of this standard are
coming, because the CENELEC defined 10-year cycle of its standards innovation. The paper discusses
some observations of problems of this standard application from the position of safety assessor which
gives us the contact with developers applying this standard into the real railway products.
Keywords: Railway software applications, assessment, safety, reliability, accessibility, maintainability,
development.
1. Introduction
Since the origin, the group of CENELEC’s railway
stands [1] [2] [3] was declared as standard of all safety
related railway applications including not only inter-
locking systems, but rolling stock and related commu-
nication too.
The standard EN50126 defines its applicability to
"The specification and demonstration of RAMS for all
railway applications and at all levels of such an appli-
cation, as appropriate, from complete railway systems
to major systems and to individual and combined sub-
systems and components within these major systems,
including those containing software".
The standard EN50128 defines its application do-
main as: "This European Standard specifies procedures
and technical requirements for the development of pro-
grammable electronic systems for use in railway con-
trol and protection applications. It is aimed at use in
any area where there are safety implications. These
may range from the very critical, such as safety sig-
nalling to the non-critical, such as management infor-
mation systems. These systems may be implemented
using dedicated microprocessors, programmable logic
controllers, multiprocessor distributed systems, larger
scale central processor systems or other architectures".
And the standard EN50129 defines its scope as
electronic systems related to safety in application to
railway interlocking systems.
It means that at least standards EN50126 and
EN50128 must be reasoned in any railway system
related to safety. On the beginning of application of
these standards safety assessors required application
of these standards especially in the domain of inter-
locking systems and the rest was frequently omitted.
After the year 2011, when the second generation of
these standards has come into the operation the situa-
tion changed and the conformity with these standards
is required also by assessors of rolling stock and other
railway systems. It brings some problems described
below due to different requirements on system func-
tions in situation, when the system malfunction is
detected.
The main aim of the paper is the discussion of
problems in nowadays application of the standard
EN50128 and offering of ways how to improve it.
2. Problems of EN50128
Application
The CENELEC’s standard EN 50128 "Railway appli-
cations – Communications, signalling and processing
systems – Software for railway control and protec-
tion systems" was defined as part of three standards
group [1] [2] [3] applying standard IEC 61508 "Func-
tional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic safety-related systems" into the specific area
of railway systems. The main difference is in different
safety assessment scheme, where not only developer,
validator and assessor are reasoned but also railway
safety authority as next independent body. In the
next chapter, particular problems will be discussed:
(1.) The last version of the standard is less transpar-
ent than original one. The change of the standard
structure was asked by CENELEC due to unifica-
tion of all CENELEC standard structure. Whilst
the original standard was divided into 17 chapters
and 2 annexes, the 2011 version is organized into 9
chapters and 4 annexes (2 are new). This change
causes not only that there are no separate chapters
e.g. for software validation and assessment, but
software assurance chapter describing testing, verifi-
cation, validation and assessment is before chapter
7 describing development process! Furthermore, the
chapter 7 is named "Generic software development"
now not looking that the term "generic software"
in computer science doscon mean "common sense
software", as this term is used in the standard, but
"a class of software that can be used for a number of
different purposes without requiring modification",
as it is defined e.g. in [4] [5]. What is worse, the
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chapter 3.14 of 50128:2011 standard defines generic
software meaning some way. Thus the topic of the
chapter 7 does not give any sense. Similarly in
the chapter v 3.1.4 of original EN50128 introduces
the term "component" which is defined extremely
vague (and in the EN50128:2011 even it is not de-
fined), but especially in the area on object oriented
programming the meaning of this term if defined
precisely and totally different. Because the stan-
dard EN50128 is used especially by programmers,
such drifting of frequent term sense might cause
many misunderstandings. Because EN50128:2011
allows to understand term component also as ob-
ject, module or even function, the meaning of e.g.
chapter 7.5 might be understand totally different
by particular people in particular situations.
(2.) There is not explicitly declared applicability of
the standard to railway vehicles and especially dif-
ferences in requirements to behaviours of vehicle
control systems in the case of malfunction, which is
opposite to required behaviours of interlocking con-
trol systems in the analogical situation. Typically,
in the case of control system error vehicle must keep
moving but interlocking system can signalize stop
to all tracks and perform e.g. restart of the control
system.
(3.) There is not solved defence against targeted at-
tack (terrorism). Defence of mission critical systems
against targeted attacks e.g. requires ability of the
system to isolate attacked parts and thus to recon-
figure system. It is a big problem, because dynamic
reconfiguration is listed in table A.3 as technique
14 and it is not recommended non respecting fact
that this technique is frequently adopted e.g. in
military, cosmic or avionics systems. It is not possi-
ble to constraint this problem only to subjects of
safe communication and physical barriers. On the
other hand, standards of the information security
like ISO 27001 are rather oriented to managing sen-
sitive company information than to control systems
located in open space and communicating across it.
(4.) The standard does not solve design of pro-
grammable HW, where on interface of SW/HW
occur many specific problems which solution is not
defined in the actual standard. Many of these prob-
lems were discussed in [6], like specific problems of
design, timing and application structure but there
also another problems like problem of dedication of
safety related functions to development tools which
is related to problems discusses herein in chapter
(6.) and which is not solved. Design tools trans-
forming e.g. VHDL language into configuration bit
stream of the chip does not work deterministically
and this fact is hard to accept in safe system design.
(5.) The standard EN50128 contains extensive ap-
pendix B "Key software roles and responsibilities"
on ten pages and small appendix C "Documents con-
trol summary", which only recapitulate textual part
Figure 1. The example of lifecycle hierarchy of com-
plex system.
of the standard and do not bring any additional
information. It is good to delete such chapters
because they only decrease clarity of the standard.
(6.) Chapter 8 "Development of application data or
algorithms: systems configured by application data
or algorithms" should explain better requirements of
systems with different level of configurability. It is
hard to compare simple system which is configured
by one dimensional table of parameters and sys-
tem where safety-related functions are described in
configuration language, which is interpreted in real
time and where part on safety checks is dedicated
to development tools. The Figure 1 draws possi-
ble configuration of different life-cycles cooperating
on development of final (sometimes also generic)
application based on configurable generic kernel
where e.g. life cycle of generic system determines
requirement on LC of final application and final
application development tools life cycle.
(7.) In comparison to standard IEC 61508-3 this rail-
way standard does not contain equivalent of IEC
61508-3 appendix C explaining which SW property
is achieved by which technique. Such explanation
is useful both for designers and assessors because
it simplifies, objectivises and formalizes selection of
design techniques in atypical, non-standard situa-
tions where groups of design techniques predefined
in the table A.3 are inapplicable. Typical exam-
ple of this situation is in this moment application
of programmable HW, which is not solved in the
standards and which requires a little bit different
approach than standard HW and SW.
(8.) There is not solved problem of design of systems
with Safety Integrity Level greater than 4. Growing
complexity of railway systems, especially of such
systems as ERTMS, tends to requirement of such
SIL. It is true, that many calls for higher SILs are
given by misunderstandings of SIL meaning. SIL is
related to tolerable hazard rate, as it is introduced
in the standard EN 50129, table A.1. Tolerable
hazard rate is related to one hour and one function,
but many designers of railway systems missrelates it
to number of invocations of the function and means
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that systems working on higher operation frequency
must have higher SIL. It is mistake.
(9.) There is not well defined that SILs are determined
to top-level functions, not to whole system and
not to any sub-functions. The standard EN50129
uses formulation single function without precision
of the complexity of the function. Many top-level
functions are performed by groups of lower level
functions. This lack of precise definition tends to
many useless discussions between manufactures and
assessors.
(10.) The standard defines five different SIL levels but
de facto it specifies only three different cases: SIL0,
SIL1 and 2; and SIL 3 and 4. In addition, require-
ments to SIL 1 and 2 systems are inappropriate
strict as well as there are requirements to docu-
mentation complexity of SIL0 systems, especially
in comparison to COTS systems of the equal SIL
level. But in fact it would be just opposite – e.g.
it is need to do precise testing developed by other
company, which design process is not well described,
where the documentation is missing, than in the
case of well documented one.
3. Discussion
Ten year cycle of CENELEC standard upgrade is
difficult especially to rolling stock manufacturers. Lo-
comotives, carriages and other vehicles have extremely
long life-cycle taking any tens of years. There is long
design phase including real research, own assessment
phase sometimes takes about ten years and also oper-
ation is reasoned in horizon of thirty years or more.
Thus the idea that between start of design and start
of operation the required standard will be once or
even two times changes is not acceptable. Because
CENELEC does not accept this fact, rolling stock
making companies provide "diverse activity" in re-
lated CENELEC work-groups and prevents significant
changes of these standards. On the opposite side,
above mentioned problems does not represent signif-
icant changes of the standards and their acceptance
in the new generation of them might increase their
applicability.
4. Conclusions
The above presented paper summarises problems on
the today railway standard EN50128:2011, which were
observed in certification body of Czech technical uni-
versity in Prague – COV FD ČVUT v Praze during
certifications of many railway systems serving espe-
cially (but not only) in Czech Republic.
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